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Article 8

Euthanasia: An Inclusive Definition
by Patricia Mazzarella
Georgetown University

We continue to share with our remotest ancestors the most tangled and evasive
attitudes about death, despite the great distance we have come in understanding
some of the profound aspects of biology. We have as much distaste for talking
about personal death as for thinking about it; it is an indelicacy, like talking in
mixed company about venereal disease or abortion in the old days. Death on a
grand scale does not bother us in the same special way: we can sit around a dinner
table and discuss war, involving 60 million volatized human deaths, as though we
were talkingJlbout the weather; we can watch abrupt bloody death every day, in
color, on films and television, without blinking back a tear. It is when the numbers
of dead are very small and very close that we begin to think in scurrying circles. I
Lewis Thomas, The Lives of a Cell

We might attribute the scurrying circles to many factors. The concerns
and fears related to our personal death and to that of near friends and
relatives are centered both on the process of dying and on a consideration of
what we might or might not encounter after the process is complete.
When reasoning about the fact of death as we encounter it in the daily
news of world and local affairs, we must maintain a degree of emotional
detachment in order to process the information and its implications and to
make judgments about it. If we were to permit emotion to surface to the
extent justified over, for instance, the atrocities recently experienced in the
Persian Gulf, the anger would render sensitive people incapable of fruitful
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action in any part of their lives. But, when reasoning about the fact of our
personal death or that of someone close, it is more difficult to maintain
detachment. Our very deepest fears and concerns are touched, and
reasoning is unavoidably influenced by those considerations. The questions
are the same for everyone, with, perhaps, different ones having top priority:
Is death the end of consciousness or of personal identity?
Will there by anyone who will care lovingly for me as my control over life wanes?
Will my psychological suffering be too great as I gradually lose control over my life?
Will I suffer unbearable pain?

In response to these concerns, the issue of euthanasia has aroused great
interest. It has arisen in order to deal with the loss of autonomy during the
dying process as physical, and sometimes psychological, competence
wanes. It is also a proposed remedy for the physical and psychological pain
experienced during this sometimes difficult passage.
The term "euthanasia" is derived from Greek roots which mean good or
happy death . Current usage has brought us to an interpretation of "good"
as meaning quick or painless or assisted, or al1 three. The pros and cons of
euthanasia have been argued in relation to the two common branches of
this definition - active and passive which are qualified by whether the
decisions to proceed are voluntary or involuntary. In this paper, I wil1
present these arguments briefly, including the one proposed by the
Hemlock Society that "self-deliverance," a euphemism for active
euthanasia, is good for both the individual and society. I wil1 answer them
from the perspective that neither of the common definitions in any of their
interpretations develop the most inclusive understanding of the term
"euthanasia." Neither do, in fact, al10w for an interpretation of "good"
which is wide enough to encompass al1 of the relevant particular goods
which are in the patient's best interest without bringing harm to others in his
or her personal or social network. The definition of euthanasia which I
propose is one which provides benefit to the individual while at the same
time expanding the common good in ways that are universal1y acceptable .
.. Although this "new definition" - actual1y an ancient one - may include
. what is termed passive euthanasia, it is wider. It accounts for long term
effects as wel1 as short. Very simply, it is the good that is found in being
surrounded and assisted during the dying process by a network offamiliar,
caring persons.
Ethical Significance of Distinctions
Does this seem too simple? Or unrealistic? Perhaps it will not seem so
after we examine the philosophical structure ofthis proposal. But first, it is
important to look briefly at the ethical significance of the sets of distinctions
mentioned earlier. The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is
also described as the difference between kil1ing and al10wing to die. There
are some who say that there is never any moral relevance between kil1ing
and al10wing to die. They propose that the rightness or wrongness is in the
end intended (that end being to save the person suffering), that both are
November, 199 1
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voluntary choices honoring the person's autonomy, and that both involve
performing an act that affects the timing of the dying process.
Those who argue that there exists a significant moral difference base their
considerations on the place that causality holds in those actions. To explain
this, I would like to give you a simple graphic representation which was first
brought to my attention by the philosopher Philippa Foot. In the case of
active euthanasia, there is an intervention in a process which is moving from
A to D. By adding B, a lethal injection, we are changing the process and
causing it to move to D I. If A is birth on March 13, 1927 and D is death on
September 27, 1990, the cause of death would be a lethal injection at DI,
June 10, 1990.
In the case of passive euthanasia, whether it is a decision to withdraw
life-support or not to treat, for instance, with antibiotics , the action is not a
matter of intervention in the process which will, if unimpeded by any other
causal event, move from A to D. We are not adding B, which would be a
new factor in the equation, but rather removing C, a temporary barrier
added at some point to retard the ongoingness of the process. A person
born at A might live to D on September 27, 1990 without any interventions
such as life support systems which we will call C. With the help o{ C, he
might live to October 30, 1990. And so the removal of C more or less brings
D, the time of death, back to the original end of the process in September,
1990. The point of this argument, then, is clearly that the new cause of death
is not the disease or the process itself, but the actions of the person
administering the injection or whatever.
Long and Short Term
A less theoretical set of considerations lies in an evaluation of the effects
of each approach . As in all ethically significant actions, there are short and
long term effects, both direct and indirect. The short term effects influence
both the dying person and his or her immediate network . In the case of
active euthanasia, all possibilities are cut off. For the individual, there is no
possibility of benefitting from a newly discovered treatment or cure, no
possibility of participation in research, no possibility of changing one's
mind. For the dying person's close network, there is the likelihood of
lowering the morale of those who perform the act, or of those who are
aware of this act. If the person is hospitalized , there can be - with
acceptance of active euthanasia - a diminishing of the sensitivities of the
staff who are dedicated to preserving life.
The long term negative effects are of two types: the slippery slope and the
formation of cultural norms and consequent public policy. Decisions on the
slippery slope proceed downhill morally from those which are made
voluntarily by persons in terminal stages of incurable illness to decisions
made for themselves by those who are nonterminal, as we saw in the
Kevorkian case. Finally, the slide progresses to decisions made by others for
those who are nonterminal and / or unable to make informed, rational
decisions about their lives. This group may include handicapped and
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so-called non-productive members of society of all ages. Such a move,
called "crypthanasia" is well-documented in the Dutch experience. 2 The
second long-term effect is the normalizing of a practice within a cultural,
national, or international community. Once a practice is accepted, it tends
to become the popular measure against which "the good" or good actions
are measured. Members of that society then experience internal and
external pressures to conform to that newly estalished norm. When active
euthanasia is legalized in a culture, felt obligations to spend time, money
and energy taking care of the dying are minimized (unless countered by
other understandings of "good"). The result is that individuals may come to
feel that they are burdensome to family and society and that they are
obligated to spare others from having to care for them. And the important
others who might be willing to form an ongoing support system are
encouraged by the popular norm to expect that they will not be called on to
give in any costly or time-consuming way. Terminal care could then become
an efficient process, not to be extended beyond the boundaries set by the
community .
. Another foreseeable abuse arising from the policy of active euthanasia
lies in the possibility of encouraging this decision for the purpose of
increasing organ procurement. Euthanasia, in this case, is described as a
benevolent act which can aid others by donation of body parts. Organ
donation may be a good and altruistic act, but it ought not to be factored in
any decision to hasten death. Even using a utilitarian calculus with a
positive outcome, it would be difficult to determine the psychological
capacity of a dying person to overcome the subtly coercive argument that
hastening one's death to donate organs somehow increases one's worth.
On the other hand , for those who are experiencing dying as a very
traumatic experience, active euthanasia would shorten the period of
suffering (and suffering is a highly subjective experience). Scarce resources
would be freed for use by those with a good prognosis, and there might be a
general lessening of anxiety related to the concerns of pain, loss of
autonomy, and prolongation of the dying process. As I have argued,
however, the benefit does not outweigh the burdens. There are better ways
to counter the trauma and to alleviate the fears.
In the case of passive euthanasia, or allowing to die, the practical factor
that differentiates it from active euthanasia is that the possibilities are not
cut off. No finality is engineered. This procedure is subject to the same
abuses, such as being motivated by organ procurement, and similar slippery
slope problems, such as nontreatment of treatable defects in handicapped
newborns. However, when such abuses are avoided, euthanasia described
as "allowing to die" has the effect of honoring the person's wishes, and so
autonomy, without introducing an additional factor which is the cause of
death. It preserves scarce resources only incidentally, not as an intended
result of a culturally sanctioned act of killing. This, of course, is not the
primary intended result of active euthanasia, but when "crypthanasia"
begins, the balance has begun to weigh in that direction.
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Lewis Thomas also says in his wonderful book:
Perhaps we would not be so anxious to prolong life if we did not detest so much the
sickness of withdrawaL It is astonishing how little information we have a bout this
universal process. J

What many people do not know about this universal process is that
almost all physical pain can be alleviated. It is the psychological pain that is
so individual and subjective. It depends on a person's worldview, beliefs
about whether death is the end of all subjective awareness and identity, on
the psychological strengths and weaknesses of the person - perhaps there
has always been a struggle with suicidal tendencies and this is a welcome
release. But the most important factor in psychological pain is often the
existence and quality of the support network which is surrounding the
person during what Lewis terms the withdrawal process. In our society we
want to turn away from the unpleasant, to be upbeat and winners. Dying is
seen as losing, unpleasant, a burden on those who would get on with their
lives. So dying is isolating, losing contact with all one loves and values.
Many friends and family members tend to turn away so as not to be
reminded of the inevitability of their own mortality.
There are some who argue that active euthanasia is a compassionate
response to this discomfort with the dying process. As I have mentioned,
they propose that it is a kindness on the part of a dying person to spare
others the burdens of caring for him or her. But, again, would it not be the
case that once this is established as a norm it would have attendant duties to
ask for euthanasia? Those who want to live on and be cared for to the
natural end of the process would begin to feel guilty for imposing their
needs on reluctant others. And so the psychological pain and isolation of
many dying persons would be increased.
Compassion, I propose, lies not in the removal of oneself from the
network, but in the dual role, experienced at different times in one's life, of
caring and of allowing oneself to be cared for. By a consistent giving of
oneself in love and support to others in one's personal network who are in
the process of dying, it might then be reasonably expected that the period of
one's own dying will be comfortably attended by members of an accepting
network who consider that process a part of, not an intrusion into their life.
The inclusive definition of euthanasia, then, is one which incorporates
passive euthanasia, for the reasons mentioned, but encompasses a notion of
"good" which is not limited to just that beneficent act. Compassion and
caring in the ways indicated are the measures for a wider set of criteria by
which we can evaluate the kinds of "good" in what we term "good death". It
benefits the individual by preserving fully the option to be cared for as a
reasonable personal and societal expectation. It helps to prepare each
individual for personal death by allowing him or her to have experience
through personal participation in the dying process of others. And it
develops the virtues of compassion and caring in each man and woman who
actively participates in daily assistance of his or her friend or relative. Such
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physical and emotional support is not always comfortable for the
inexperienced - or for the experienced, for that matter. But, just as men
and women learn to care for infants because of love and responsibility, the
same learning process is possible for the personal care of elders who have
contributed so much to our lives. Would anyone consider it a state or
medical profession responsibility to provide for infant care during that first,
sometimes difficult year of life with crying during the night and total
dependence? Lewis Thomas comments:
It used to be the hardest and most important of all the services of a good doctor to

be on hand at the time of death, and to provide comfort, usually in the home. Now
it is done in hospitals, in secrecy (one of the reasons for the increased fear of death
these days may be that so many people are totally unfamiliar with it; they never
actually see it happen in real life). Some of our technology permits us to deny its
existence, and we maintain flickers of life for long stretches in one community of
cells or another, as though we were keeping a flag flying.4

As for a preservation of the common good, such an inclusive
understanding of good death avoids the slippery slope which leads to
involuntary euthanasia and to the subtle psychological coercion for
donation of organs. In addition, it has no place for the establishment of
legal and practical norms which are based on the honoring of the autonomy
of some while eliminating the support systems which would facilitate the
exercise of automony by others who think differently. Most importantly,
however, it prevents the desensitization of the community as a whole to the
short and long term effects of the establishment of such a norm.
This definition is based on an old practice, as you may have noted. The
foundations are rooted in a philosophical perspective called an ethic of care,
which is a morality based on the assumption that all persons are
dynamically interconnected in a personal and social network of relations. 5
Aristotle was aiming at this when he stressed the social embeddedness of
persons. It counters the notion of a human being as an "economic man" or a
social contractor equal in all ways and entitled primarily to noninterference.
But the dying are not equal in many ways. One significant difference is that
they are dependent on caretakers and interact in their social network from a
position of unique vulnerability. I am proposing that this dependence, if
accepted with graciousness, generosity, and compassion, benefits both the
individual and society in the ways I have discussed. The dying are not
"economic men" to be valued according to their social contributions, past
and potential. They are members of a community who are bound by sets of
attchments . From a care perspective, to detach and "not interfere", as one
does in honoring the request for active euthanasia, is to abandon, to
separate, to provide for the seeds of isolation in the neglected .
An ethic of care stresses the honoring of attachments, those which are
personal and those which are formed as common members of a human
community. This is shown in availability and responsibility, often, perhaps
usually, when it is inconvenient and not paid for. The model of economic
man stresses impartiality and noninterference with an individual's liberty to
November, 1991
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choose. The ethic of care stresses that partiality and involvement are a gift of
the chosen and unchosen attachments that are unavoidably formed by
members born into the world community. It is only by allowing oneself to
fully experience such caring that one learns how to give it to others. And it is
only by giving such caring that others learn how to continue the process
which strengthens human bonds. In the situations of attachment which are
a natural part of our social embeddedness, the impartiality advocated by
proponents of the economic man model 6 is not possible because one's self is
at least partially defined by these relations with others.
Good death, then, is a return to the ancient custom of death as attended
by the community. Edmund Pellegrino writes that " ... sorrow and death
are part of the tragic condition of man. They are not transcended by
medicine so much as made bearable."7Good medicine can alleviate the pain
and, perhaps, some of the psychological suffering. Compassion and caring
properly expressed can do the rest.
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